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This paper presents some microevidence on the techno-economic consequences of Austrian 
VOC emission standards, the most restrictive of their kind in the world. Using firm-level survey 
data and complementing it with highly disaggregated foreign trade data, the paper explores 
whether the standards had a palpable impact on the competitiveness of Austrian manufacturers 
of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives, whether compliance stimulated innovation in 
this industry, whether the standards crowded out other, more productive R&D, and whether 
compliance efforts gave rise to unexpected benefits of compliance. It finds no unequivocal ag-
gregate impact on the competitiveness of regulated firms, yet some interesting variation at the 
firm-level. However, the standards appear to have dampened import competition. The standards 
gave rise to considerable changes in firms' product range and appear to have accelerated the rate 
of product innovation in the regulated industry. R&D spending to develop compliant products is 
found to be very unevenly distributed, mainly due to technological to a lesser extent organisa-
tional factors. There is evidence that compliance efforts displaced or postponed existing R&D 
projects. However, there is also evidence that search for compliant products yielded unexpected 
and beneficial ideas, knowledge and competencies. 
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1. Introduction 
What are the techno-economic consequences of environmental regulation? To the extent that any adapta-
tions are required, standard economics predicts that compliance efforts may induce R&D, which may lead 
to the development of new, environmentally benign technologies. However, compliance innovations 
come at a price to the individual firm. Since adding a constraint to the profit maximisation problem of a 
firm inevitably reduces profits, for example through higher production costs and/or the crowding out of 
more productive activities, regulated firms become less competitive vis-à-vis their unregulated rivals. 
Society as whole, however, may benefit through the removal of an undesirable externality (see Palmer 
and Oates 1995). 
In a series of papers, Michael Porter challenged this view, arguing that it was the result of a 'static mind-
set' (Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde 1995a, b). Instead, in what has subsequently become known as 
the 'Porter Hypothesis', he suggested that there may be a positive relationship between environmental 
regulation and the competitiveness of regulated firms, as 'properly designed' environmental regulation 
may set off efforts by firms to find more efficient ways of producing or to develop new products that 
command higher margins. Such benefits from innovation may partially or even fully offset private adapta-
tion costs. 
Porter's argument implies the systematic existence of hitherto unexploited, profitable investment opportu-
nities, which firms only realise if prodded by regulators. Quite naturally, this proposition has attracted a 
great deal of attention in the policy community. Economists, meanwhile, have devoted considerable effort 
to theoretically and empirically exploring the validity of Porter's reasoning. Theoretical research within 
the neo-classical framework has identified a number of instances where the presence of some sort of posi-
tive externality may indeed produce results consistent with Porter's hypothesis (for example Xepapadeas 
and de Zeeuw 1999; Mohr 2002). Dropping the assumption of perfectly rational, monolithic firms and 
arguing instead in terms of routine-based behaviour in the spirit of Cyert and March (1992), additional 
situations can be construed in which the introduction of an environmental regulation may uncover oppor-
tunities to save money that previously went unnoticed, for example due to the absence of appropriate 
reporting systems (Gabel and Sinclaire-Desgagné 1999). However, whether any of these situations sys-
tematically occur is an empirical question. 
Empirical efforts to test the 'Porter Hypothesis' have focused on the impact of environmental regulation 
and competitiveness or innovation, attempting to establish a link between some measure of regulatory 
stringency and some measure of competitiveness or innovation (for reviews, see Jaffe et al. 1995; Jeppe-
sen et al. 2000; Mulatu et al. 2001). The results of these exercises, however, are mixed and rather vague. 
The considerable number of studies investigating the link between the stringency of environmental regu-
lation and shifts in trade-patterns of pollution intensive goods or shifts in the location of capital invest-
ment in pollution intensive industries (foreign direct investment flows or plant location behaviour) as 
proxies for changes in competitiveness have produced few statistically significant results. Of these, the 
majority have the expected negative sign, but there are also some estimates of a positive relationship (for  
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example Xu 2000). Moreover, parameters tend to be rather small. Econometric studies on the impact of 
environmental regulation on innovation (Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Jaffe and Palmer 1997) find that in-
creases in environmental compliance expenditures may boost R&D spending and patenting of compliant 
technologies. They do not, however, find evidence that environmental regulation has a positive (or for 
that matter any) impact on total innovative activity. 
There are essentially two explanations for these rather unsatisfactory results: First, there are substantial 
measurement problems. Owing to the large number of direct and indirect cost components (for a thorough 
discussion, see Jaffe et al. 1995, pp. 139-142), it is virtually impossible to obtain accurate measures of the 
full costs of environmental regulation, especially across countries and over time. Moreover, compliance 
costs and hence by implication the impact of environmental regulation are highly industry- or even firm-
specific. However, lack of sufficiently disaggregated data forces researchers to use country-level or 
highly aggregated industry-level data that may systematically bias results (see Levinson 2001). Second, 
actual costs of compliance are rather low, representing only a minor fraction of total production costs (see 
Stewart 1993, p. 2105; Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 158). 
In order to confront some of these shortcomings, this paper will adopt a different strategy. Rather than 
looking for a suitable proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation and regressing it on appropri-
ate proxies for competitiveness or innovation, it will start out with a set of environmental regulations 
which are known to have had a considerable impact on the regulated industry, and look for evidence rele-
vant to the 'Porter Hypothesis'. The standards in question are Austrian Volatile Organic Compound 
(VOC) emission standards, which were and still are by far the strictest of their kind in the world. Using 
firm-level survey data and complementing it with highly disaggregated foreign trade data, the following 
questions will be addressed: First, did Austrian VOC emission standards have a palpable impact on the 
competitiveness of Austrian manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives? Second, did 
these regulations stimulate or even accelerate innovation in this industry? Third, did the standards crowd 
out other, more productive R&D? Fourth, did compliance efforts give rise to unexpected benefits of com-
pliance? 
It must be emphasised that the benefits of the case study approach adopted in this paper, namely the abil-
ity to highlight effects which are difficult or even impossible to pinpoint with more aggregate data, come 
at a price: Because of the specificity of the data and the small number of observations, it is impossible to 
go beyond a purely descriptive analysis. 
The remaining sections of this paper are structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Austrian 
VOC emission standards and the data used in this paper. Section 3 explores the impact of the regulations 
on the competitiveness of Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive manufacturers. Section 4 
examines how the standards affected regulated firms' innovation behaviour, investigating above all 
whether and to what extent the environmental regulations affected other R&D and whether compliance 
efforts gave rise to beneficial side effects implied by the 'Porter Hypothesis'. Section 5 summarises the 
main results and gives directions for future research.  
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2.  Regulations and data 
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) are a diverse set of highly reactive organic chemical compounds 
that play a major role in ground-level ozone formation. In the mid- and late 1980s, ground-level ozone 
had become a major environmental concern in Austria, leading to the adoption of a series of three legisla-
tive measures to reduce the use and emission of VOCs as solvents in paints, coatings, printing inks and 
adhesives as well as the application of conventional, that is solvent-based, systems in industrial produc-
tion processes, which together account for roughly 40 per-cent of total anthropogenic VOC emissions in 
Austria. Two product standards restricted the maximum content of aromatics and organic solvents in 
these products while a process standard mandated the installation of pollution control equipment for in-
dustrial applications emitting more than a fairly low amount of VOCs each year. The product standards 
and process standards pertaining to new installations entered into force in 1996 while slightly less restric-
tive rules regulating existing installations where staggered by size and became binding in 1998 and 2000, 
respectively. 
Two sources of data will be use to explore the techno-economic consequences of the VOC emission stan-
dards. Foreign trade data has been obtained from the UN commodity trade database via the Austrian Insti-
tute of Economic Research. Since data is available at the SITC 5-digit level, it has been possible to pin-
point the respective product categories, which are SITC 5332 (printing ink), 5334 (paints & varnishes; 
stamping foils; dye packs etc), 59227 (glues from starches, dextrins or other modified starches) and 59229 
(prepared glues & adhesives n.e.s; retail packages etc). 
The second data source is a survey conducted by the author on the Austrian paints, coatings, printing inks 
and adhesives industry. The survey had been designed as an exploratory pilot study to obtain fairly broad 
information on the industry and technologies as well as the techno-economic consequences of the Aus-
trian VOC emission standards. Because of the large amount of desired information and the relatively 
small size of the industry under scrutiny, the survey was conducted via standardised in-depth interviews 
with senior executives, mostly managing directors or the respective heads of R&D. Interviews lasted 
between 30 minutes and two hours. After several rounds of development and revision, the survey was 
conducted by the author in 1999 from July 28 to Oct 17. It covered 28 out of 29 independent, Austrian 
manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives. Although precise figures are not available, 
this represents more than 95% of the industry in terms of turnover and employment, amounting essen-
tially to a full survey. 
The paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry is a highly fragmented industry, dominated by a 
handful of large, multinational enterprises and very large number of small and medium-sized niches play-
ers. For instance, the average German paint and coating manufacturer has 50-100 employees and an an-
nual turnover of EUR 15-20 million (Deutsches Lackinstitut 2001). However, it must be noted that such 
statistics can be misleading as subsidiaries of multinational firms are mostly locally registered firms, and 
firm and plant size easily get confused. 
Table 1 displays the size distribution of firms in the Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive 
industry. Firms were assigned to size categories according to Recommendation 96/280/EC by the Euro- 
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pean Commission which sets out size categories for small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe. Ac-
cording to this classification, a firm is small if it has annual revenues of less than EUR 7 million, medium 
sized if its annual revenues are greater EUR 7 but less than EUR 40 million and large if it generates an-
nual revenues in excess of EUR 40 million. Table 1 shows that there are six small, twelve medium-sized 
and ten large firms in the data set. 
Table 1: Structure of the Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and 
adhesive industry (1998) 
 Small  Medium-
Sized  Large Total 
Product group        
OEM 2  5  6  13 
Architectural coatings  1  6  1  8 
Printing inks  2  1  1  4 
Adhesives 1  0  2  3 
All firms  6  12  10  28 
Note: OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacture, which are industrial coatings.  n=28 
Moreover, Table 1 displays information on firms' technological profiles. Paints, coatings, printing inks 
and adhesives are related, yet distinctly different technologies. Based on information on firms' product 
range, each firm could be assigned to one of four categories, namely manufacturer of industrial coatings 
(original equipment manufacture, OEM), architectural coatings, printing inks and adhesives. Table 1 
shows that there are 13 manufacturers of industrial coatings, eight architectural coatings manufacturers, 
four firms manufacturing printing inks and three manufacturers of adhesives. In terms of the distribution 
of technology profiles across size categories, OEM are predominantly medium-sized and large firms, 
while manufacturers of architectural coatings are mostly medium-sized firms. Printing ink manufacturers 
are small and medium-sized, while adhesive manufacturers are predominantly large firms. 
3. Competitiveness 
In principle, the expected sign of the net impact of environmental regulation on the competitiveness of 
regulated firms or industries is by no means clear, as three conflicting forces may be at work:  
♦  First, restrictive environmental regulations, in particular process regulations and liability rules, may 
raise production costs and divert resources from more productive investments, which should hurt the 
competitiveness of regulated firms and cause them to lose market share abroad. Environmental prod-
uct regulations may have similar effects, which applies even if exports are exempt from domestic 
rules due to lower scale economies. 
♦  Second, if foreign rivals are not subject to similar product, process or liability rules, regulated firms 
may also lose market share in their home markets. Having said that, facially non-discriminatory regu-
lations imposing uniform product standards may effectively favour domestic firms, as domestic 
manufacturers are likely to enjoy economies of scale in compliant products (for some empirical ex-
amples, see Stewart 1993, p. 2043). This may inflict a cost disadvantage on foreign firms.  
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♦  Third, dynamic 'innovation offsets' may more than fully offset negative static effects. To the extent 
that such innovation offsets lead to lower production costs and/or more profitable products, regulated 
firms should become more competitive. The latter argument is also known as the 'strong version' of 
the 'Porter Hypothesis' (see Jaffe and Palmer 1997). 
In the case of Austrian VOC emission standards, any of these three forces may be at work. Although 
products destined for export need not comply with the rules governing organic solvents if so required by 
foreign customers, obtaining such an exemption involves administrative paperwork which imposes addi-
tional costs and may be a serious obstacle in the case of time-critical orders. Also, Austrian manufacturers 
must effectively split their scarce resources between cleaner and conventional products with obvious 
consequences for scale economies in R&D and production. At the same time, domestic product standards 
may put foreign firms at a disadvantage as export volumes to Austria may be too small to warrant the 
development of compliant products. Finally, compliant products may create new chances for domestic 
firms abroad, either through first-mover advantages because of subsequent environmental regulation in 
other countries, or because new products are genuinely better (and cheaper) than their conventional rivals. 
A common measure of the competitiveness of a sector or industry is the revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) index, which is an empirical estimate of a country's comparative advantage in a particular com-
modity group as revealed by actual trade patterns. The evolution of this index will be used to explore the 
net impact of Austrian VOC emission standards on the competitiveness of Austrian manufacturers of 
paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives. Because it is an index, it is insensitive to inflation, macro-
economic imbalances and growth effects, all of which may impact on the value of international trade 
flows (see Xu 2000). Several measures of RCA have been proposed in the literature, each of which may 
be distorted by aggregation and policy effects (see Greenaway and Milner 1993, pp. 184-187). However, 
assuming distortions to be relatively stable over limited periods of time, these well-known problems are 
of little concern in the present case, as the focus is on changes over time, not absolute levels. 
Because we are interested in the net impact of Austrian VOC emission standards on both exports and 
imports, the following widely used formula (see, for example, Siebert 2000, p. 82) will be used, which 
























RCA ln , 
where X are exports, M are imports, i is the exporting country, and j is the commodity group (industry). 
The index takes the natural logarithm of the ratio of country i's net-exports of commodity j (Xij/Mij) and 
country i's total net-exports (of all goods or of all goods of a certain type, ΣXij/ΣMij). Values greater one 
reveal a comparative advantage. 
In order to ascertain the impact of the Austrian VOC emission standards on the competitiveness of manu-
facturers of regulated products, the RCA of the Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry 
will be compared to the RCA of its German and EU counterpart for the period 1990-1999, the most recent 
year for which data is available. Germany and the EU are selected as yardsticks since they are subject to  
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similar macroeconomic conditions but did not adopt comparable regulations during this period. Austria is 
closely integrated into the German economy (in 1998, 42% of total exports and 36% total imports were 
traded with Germany), has had a currency peg for about thirty years and tends to track the German econ-
omy very closely. Although the paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry in the two countries is 
not fully comparable – Germany is home to some of the world's largest players – in terms of intervening 
macroeconomic factors Germany is by far the most similar country. As an additional check, the entire EU 
paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry is also considered. 
The underlying data series feature a number of structural breaks, including the German reunification and 
the expansions of the EU in 1995, when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU. With regard to Aus-
tria, the removal of trade barriers in the aftermath of joining the EU significantly boosted foreign trade, 
both with fellow member states and third countries due to the EU's lower external tariffs (Breuss 2000). 
Moreover, Austria's accession to the EU also had important consequences for the nature of Austrian for-
eign trade data. Prior to 1995, all foreign trade data was recorded at the border. Since Austria's accession 
to the EU, this practice has only been maintained for trade with third countries (Extrastat), while trade 
with fellow EU member states (Intrastat) has been measured by a selective mail survey. However, unless 
any of these events has had an uneven impact on exports or net-exports of the paint, coating, printing ink 
and adhesive industry in any of the regions considered, the effect will vanish as the index is based on 
ratios, not absolute values. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of comparative advantage as 'revealed' by the RCA index. The line charts 
stand for the respective RCA values, while the bar charts display the annual rate of change of each data 
series. The German series increases slightly while the EU series remains almost flat during the observa-
tion period. With regard to the critical period in the second half of the 1990s, both series show a slight 
decline in 1995, followed by a rise in 1996 and 1997, a drop in 1998 and an increase in 1999. In contrast, 
the Austrian series exhibits a strong slump in the early 1990s, followed by a prolonged decline until 1995, 
a brief drop in 1996, a strong jump in 1997 and a decline in the subsequent two years. 
As with many comparable studies, it is difficult to make out an unequivocal effect, for the Austrian series 
neither displays a clear negative trend consistent with the standard view on the impact of environmental 
regulation on competitiveness, nor the unambiguously positive relationship posited by proponents of the 
'Porter Hypothesis'. Since the implementation of the standards in 1996, the Austrian RCA in paints, coat-
ings, printing inks and adhesives has declined in three out of the four years for which data is available. 
While this is also true of the yardstick series in 1998, the deterioration in 1996 and especially 1999 is 
confined to the Austrian series. On the other hand, the general downward trend is interrupted by a strong 
jump in the Austrian series in 1997, which is mainly driven by a 20 per cent increase in exports of the 
regulated commodity groups, at a time when any negative impact of the environmental regulations should 
have been felt strongest. Although the two yardstick series also exhibit a rise in 1997, it is moderate com-
pared to the Austrian series.  
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If it was not for the sharp decline in 1999, one would thus conclude that the strictest environmental regu-
lations of their kind have certainly not harmed the competitiveness of Austrian manufacturers of paints, 
coatings, printing inks and adhesives. Whether the deterioration in 1999 is a singular event or the begin-
ning of a prolonged downward trend due to the process standards slowly starting to bite cannot be ascer-
tained in the absence of more recent data. 
Survey evidence, however, points to the former interpretation. In the survey, Austrian paint, coating, 
printing ink and adhesive manufacturers were asked whether their competitiveness had been affected by 
the VOC emission standards, a) in their Austrian home market, b) in the EU and EFTA, and c) in other 
countries, that is mainly Central and Eastern Europe. Table 2 shows that the large majority of firms (be-
tween two thirds and three quarters) found themselves unaffected in each region. In some cases (roughly 
10-15%), competitiveness deteriorated, while in a roughly equal number of cases it actually improved. 
This is particularly striking in the case of the EU/EFTA area, where the number of firms that report an 
improved competitiveness outweighs the number of firms whose competitiveness was negatively affected 
by a margin of two to one. 
It is interesting to note that almost 20 per cent of the small firms saw their competitiveness deteriorate and 
not a single one experienced an improvement, while just one large firm suffered a decline and this only in 
Austria, and up to 30 per cent report an improved competitiveness. However, only one firm suffered in all 
three regions. One firm reports to have benefited in each region, while another firm benefited both in 
Austria and its main export markets. The remaining firms discriminate quite carefully, which supports the 
reliability of the results. For example, one firm declares to have suffered in Austria but benefited in one 
export region. Other companies were unaffected in some regions but suffered or benefited elsewhere. 
Table 2:  Reported impact of VOC emission standards on competitiveness 
– Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive manufac-
turers (1999) 
Region Austria  EU/EFTA  Other  countries  
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Frequency  no. % no. % no. % 
Unaffected  21 75.0 12 66.7 15 78.9 
Deteriorated  4 14.3  2 11.1  2 10.5 
Improved  3 10.7  4 22.2  2 10.5 
  n=28 
The survey results are interesting in that they highlight that even within a fairly homogeneous industry, 
firms may be unevenly affected by an external shock. In other words, even if an environmental policy 
intervention threatens to impose costs on the majority of targeted firms, there may be some firms who 
actually benefit from a restrictive regulation, which may have important consequences for the policy 
design process. 
Which factors account for this result? Regarding Austria, a possible factor may be reduced import compe-
tition, which also affects the above measure of RCA which is based on net-exports. In order to check 
whether Austrian VOC emission standards indeed reduced import competition, Figure 2 maps the evolu-
tion of imports of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives (SITC categories 533x, 5922x) as a share 
of total imports in Austria, Germany and the EU. In other words, the figure displays how imports of SITC 
categories 533x, 5922x evolved relative to total imports in each country/region. To ensure comparability, 
the data has been normalised with 1990 as base year. 







































For Austria, the line chart shows an inverted U-shaped pattern. Until 1993, the share of imports of paints, 
coatings, printing inks and adhesives increased relative to overall imports. As of that year, it declined 
again, except for a small rebound in 1998. In contrast, the German series fluctuates quite substantially 
around a more or less stable mean and the EU series displays a slight upward trend during most of the 
observation period. Although the inflection in the Austrian series occurs prior to the implementation of 
the VOC emission standards in 1996, the prolonged decline after 1996 provides some tentative evidence 
that import growth in paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives has indeed been held back by the Aus-
trian VOC emission standards. This result is not unexpected in light of the existing literature, yet interest- 
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ing in this specific case, since the industry has generally recorded a substantial increase in competition 
since joining the EU in 1995. 
4. Innovation 
Another factor that may account for the rather positive development of the competitiveness of the Aus-
trian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry may be innovation offsets, as predicted by the 
'Porter Hypothesis'. Survey evidence indeed shows that Austrian VOC emission standards triggered con-
siderable adaptations in the product range of Austrian manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and 
adhesives. Almost one in three firms reports substantial changes and 60 per cent of the firms had to 
change a sizeable part of their product range. Less than ten per cent of the surveyed firms report only 
minor changes. 
Naturally, the mere fact that firms had to adapt their product range is no evidence for innovation offsets, 
as firms may simply have replaced conventional solvent-borne products with existing cleaner systems, 
which presumably were more costly and/or technologically inferior; otherwise they would have been 
introduced without regulatory pressure. In order to find out whether this was indeed true or whether com-
pliance had stimulated innovation, Austrian manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives 
were asked in the survey about their perception of how dynamic the technological environment in the 
industry had been in 1990, that is before the first VOC emission standard had been adopted and the time 
the survey was conducted in 1999. As can be seen in Figure 3, there is a clear shift. While the majority of 
firms perceived their technological environment as 'rather quiet' or 'weakly dynamic' in 1990 and not a 
single firm appraised it as 'very dynamic', in 1999 the most frequent responses were 'dynamic' and 
'weakly dynamic'. Five firms even rated the technological environment as 'very dynamic'. 
Figure 3:  Technological environment in the Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and ad-

















Note: The numbers in the boxes represent absolute frequencies  n=28 
Interestingly, the variation in how firms describe their technological environment increased substantially 
between 1990 and 1999. In 1990, responses are quite homogeneous across the size classes and product  
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groups delineated above. In 1999, the differences between the different categories become much more 
pronounced. In absolute terms, small firms perceive their technological environment as most dynamic, 
albeit subject to considerable variation. Medium-sized and large firms also report a considerable increase 
in technological dynamism, yet not as much as their smaller rivals. With regard to technology, the in-
crease in technological dynamism is strongest in the OEM segment, followed by architectural coatings 
and adhesives. Printing ink manufacturers report almost no change. 
However, even the fact that Austrian VOC emission standards appear to have accelerated the rate of 
product innovation in the Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive industry is insufficient evi-
dence for innovation offsets, as it does not convey any information on how creating innovations affected 
firms' other activities and whether firms were able to reap benefits predicted by proponents of the 'Porter 
Hypothesis'. 
In order to find out whether and if so how compliance affected firms other activities, Austrian manufac-
turers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives were asked which share of their R&D budget they 
had devoted to developing compliant products. Figure 4 displays a histogram of the reported shares. It 
reveals a multi-modal distribution. Twelve out of the 28 surveyed firms spent less than 12.5 per cent of 
their R&D budget on compliance innovations, of which six firms reported a share of zero. At the other 
extreme, 14 firms devoted more than half of their R&D budget to developing compliant products. Shares 
are distributed very unevenly, with multiple peaks in the range of 5, 30, 60 and 75 per cent, and consider-
able ranges remaining entirely blank. 
Figure 4: Compliance R&D as a fraction of total R&D – Austrian paint, 
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Which factors account for these startling variations? Firm size does not, as the breakdown into size cate-
gories according to Recommendation 96/280/EC reveals no sizeable differences (the respective means are 
37, 46 and 38%), yet huge standard deviations indicating the presence of other factors. Table 3 shows 
these to be technology and organisational status. 
The column totals reveal considerable differences in how much manufacturers of the different product 
groups spent on developing compliant products. On average, manufacturers of OEM spent 57 per cent of  
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their total R&D budget on compliance R&D, while manufacturers of architectural coatings spent 47 per 
cent. In contrast, the respective share for manufacturers of printing inks and adhesives is only eight and 
three per cent. Since there is little variation between the different product groups in how much firms' 
product range was affected by the Austrian VOC emission standards, these results point to a qualitative 
difference in firms' compliance behaviour. While compliance by printing ink and adhesive manufacturers 
appears to have required little new technology, manufacturers of OEM and architectural coatings had to 
undertake greater development efforts. 
Table 3: Compliance R&D as a fraction of total R&D – Austrian paint, coating, printing ink 
and adhesive manufacturers (1999) 
Product group  OEM  Architectural Coat-
ings 
Printing inks  Adhesives  Total 
  Mean (SD)  no. Mean (SD)  no. Mean (SD)  no. Mean (SD)  no. Mean (SD) no. 
Corporate Status                             
Single  Establishment  80.0  (10.0) 3  75.0  (0.0) 2  0.0  (0.0) 1  – –  –  65.0  (32.6)  6 
Multi-Establishment 50.0  (32.3) 10  37.5  (41.9)  6  6.6  (9.8)  3  3.3 (5.8)  3  34.8 (35.0)  22 
Head  Office  55.0 (34.0)  4  42.0 (32.0)  3  –  –  –  –  –  –  49.3 (31.3)  7 
Regional/Divisional 
Head Office 
34.0 (26.0)  3  0.0  (0.0)  2  5.0  (0.0)  1  0.0 (0.0)  1  15.4 (23.3)  7 
Branch  Plant  59.0 (41.0)  3  100.0  (0.0)  1  13.0 (18.0)  2  5.0 (7.0)  2  39.0 (42.1)  8 
Total  56.9 (31.2)  13  46.9 (39.5)  8  7.5 (11.9)  4  3.3 (5.8)  3  41.3 (36.2)  28 
  n=28 
Moreover, organisational factors have a clear impact on the relative importance of compliance R&D vis-
à-vis other R&D. As the row totals show, there are great differences between the different categories. Up 
to a point, these are caused by the uneven distribution of technological sub-segments, as shown by the 
intersecting cells. However, comparing mean spending by single and multi-establishment firms shows 
that the former spent a higher share on compliance R&D. Among multi-establishment firms, spending on 
compliance R&D was substantially lower in the case of regional or divisional head offices, which is 
probably due to the internal organisation of R&D in these firms. Another factor that may also matter is 
focus as firms with only one establishment and branch plants may be more focused than larger corporate 
units. Accordingly, comparable amounts of R&D spending may show up as differential shares of the 
respective total R&D budgets, which in turn suggests that although the present measure does provide 
important information on how the firms were affected by the regulation, it does not reveal whether or to 
what extent spending on environmental R&D displaced other R&D. 
In order to obtain information on this point, firms were asked about the impact of compliance innovations 
on other R&D projects. More specifically, firms were asked whether other R&D projects had been can-
celled, postponed or been entirely unaffected by R&D devoted to the development of compliant products. 
Table 4 summarises the responses to this question. R&D spending on compliance innovations had the 
biggest impact on manufacturers of OEM. Almost one in three firms had to cancel and more than half had 
to postpone other R&D projects. Only two out of the surveyed 13 firms were unaffected. Manufacturers 
of architectural coatings were slightly less affected. One in four firms had to abandon and another fourth  
  12
had to postpone other R&D projects. Printing ink and adhesive manufacturers report a much smaller im-
pact. Only one firm each had to postpone some R&D projects. 
Table 4: Impact of compliance R&D on other R&D – Austrian paint, coat-
ing, printing ink and adhesive manufacturers (1999) 
Other R&D projects 
were ...  Cancelled Postponed  Unaffected Total 
Frequency  no. % no. % no. %  no. 
Product group          
OEM  4 30.8 7 53.8 2 15.4  13 
Architectural  coatings  2 25.0 2 25.0 4 50.0  8 
Printing  inks  0  0.0 1 25.0 3 75.0  4 
Adhesives  0  0.0 1 33.3 2 66.7  3 
All  firms  6  21.4 11 39.3 11 39.3  28 
Note: OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacture, which are industrial coatings.  n=28 
In light of the previous evidence on compliance R&D, these results are entirely expected. Having spent 
around half of their total R&D budget on compliance efforts, it would be very surprising if other R&D 
projects of OEM and architectural coating manufacturers had not been affected. Similarly, anything but a 
limited impact in the remaining segments would have been a surprise. This is also reflected in a Spear-
man's rho coefficient1 of 0.55 between the two variables, which indicates a medium strong correlation. 
The data confirm the very simple intuition that given limited R&D budgets, firms may no longer have the 
means to pursue other activities if an environmental regulation requires a big compliance effort. It must 
be emphasised, however, that this is no valid measure of crowding out. Crowding out only occurs if dis-
placed activities would have been more productive, however defined. Determining the presence or ab-
sence of crowding out requires an appropriate productivity measure and counterfactual, both of which are 
difficult to come by. Instead, Austrian manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives were 
asked in the survey whether the VOC emission standards had prevented them from developing or utilising 
other promising products or technologies. Table 5 reveals considerable variation between the different 
product groups and an interesting pattern across the different size classes. 
Table 5: Displacement of promising products or technologies through compliance R&D – 
Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive manufacturers (1999) 
 OEM  Architectural  Coat-
ings 
Printing inks  Adhesives 
Frequency  Many Some None  no.  Many None  no.  Many None  no.  Some None  no. 
Firm size                         
Small 50.0%  0.0%  50.0%  2  100.0%  0.0%  1  100.0%  0.0%  1  0.0%  100.0%  1 
Medium  40.0% 40.0% 20.0%  5  0.0% 100.0% 4 100.0%  0.0% 1  0.0%  0.0% 0 
                                                            
1   A nonparametric version of the Pearson correlation coefficient based on the ranks of the data rather than actual 




1 n n d rs
, where d stands for the rank distance between any two observa-
tions and n stands for the number of observations. Possible values range from +1 to –1, indicating perfect corre-
lation.  
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Large 33.3%  16.7%  50.0%  6  0.0%  100.0%  1  0.0%  100.0%  1  50.0%  50.0%  2 
All firms  38.5%  23.1%  38.5%  13  16.7%  83.3%  6  66.7%  33.3%  3  33.3%  66.7%  3 
Note: OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacture, which are industrial coatings.  n=25 
Strong displacement is reported by manufacturers of OEM and printing inks, while the respective share is 
much smaller among manufacturers of architectural coatings and adhesives. These variations are puz-
zling. From the previous evidence one would expect a fairly high impact on manufacturers of OEM and 
architectural coatings and rather little impact in the remaining two product groups. Lack of additional 
evidence prevents an explanation of this unexpected result. 
Regarding firm size, the number of firms reporting a displacement of promising products or technologies 
declines with rising firm size, although the pattern is not totally uniform across the different product 
groups. However, deviations from the general pattern may be due to the small number of observations 
where single cases can make a big absolute difference. Two arguments may explain the observed relative 
decline. First, the absolute number of displaced products or technologies may be fairly uniform across the 
different size classes. However, because of their smaller scope of activities, smaller firms perceive this 
number as relatively larger. Second, the responses may indeed reflect absolute numbers. In this case, 
displacement is an indicator of technological backwardness as it can only occur if firms fail to foresee 
future changes and duly adapt their R&D and production plans. Background information from the inter-
views makes the latter interpretation more likely. 
The evidence presented so far does not indicate the presence of innovation offsets. However, environ-
mental regulation may not only cut off promising avenues of technological advance; it may also refocus 
firms' R&D efforts. If this prompts search in hitherto unexplored areas, it may very well be that firms hit 
upon some unexpectedly profitable results. With regard to environmental regulation, Ashford et al. (1979, 
p. 179) have coined the term 'ancillary innovation' to describe such unexpected or serendipitous results of 
regulatory compliance efforts. Moreover, search may not only lead to the development of new artefacts, it 
may also create new competencies and let firms acquire new technologies that can subsequently be lever-
aged in other areas. 
The best way to collect empirical evidence on these issues are detailed case studies of innovation proc-
esses. Since this was not feasible in the present case, Austrian manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing 
inks and adhesives were instead asked, a) whether compliance efforts had given them fresh ideas for new 
products (as a rough proxy for the frequency of unexpected discoveries), and b) whether compliance had 
led to the acquisition of new competencies and technologies, which they would not have acquired in the 
absence of an environmental regulation. 
Table 6 displays a breakdown of the responses to the former question. The bottom line shows that more 
than half of the 26 respondent firms state that compliance efforts had indeed given them fresh ideas for 
new products. Interestingly, there are considerable variations between the different technological sub-
segments, ranging from a strong majority of OEM and even all adhesive manufacturers to about one in 
three manufacturers of architectural coatings and printing inks. In contrast, variations between the differ-
ent size classes are much smaller and mainly due to the dominance of architectural coating manufacturers 
in the medium-sized category. In other words, the share of firms reporting unexpected insights from com- 
  14
pliance R&D is fairly uniform across the different size classes but varies widely between the different 
product groups. 
Table 6: Share of firms obtaining new ideas from compliance R&D – 
Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive manufactur-
ers (1999) 
 Yes  no. 
Product group    
OEM 69.2%  13 
Architectural coatings  37.5%  8 
Printing inks  33.3%  3 
Adhesives 100.0%  2 
Firm Size     
Small 60.0%  5 
Medium 50.0%  12 
Large 66.7%  9 
All firms  57.7%  26 
Note: OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacture, which are industrial coatings.  n=26 
The observed pattern cannot be explained with the available data. One might conjecture that the probabil-
ity of hitting upon a chance discovery rises with the amount of resources devoted to searching. However, 
there is absolutely no correlation between the share of firms reporting unexpected insights and the share 
of total R&D allocated to compliance R&D. 
To explore a further dimension of possible serendipitous effects of environmental regulation, firms were 
asked whether they had obtained knowledge or technologies that they would not have acquired in the 
absence of the environmental regulations and which could be leveraged in other areas. Table 7 displays a 
summary of the responses to this question. As the last line shows, more than half of the firms state that 
compliance efforts had allowed them to acquire at least some new competencies and technologies which 
subsequently turned out to be useful in other areas. In terms of the different technologies, the results for 
OEM and architectural coatings resemble the results shown in Table 6. The respective percentages for 
printing inks and adhesives, however, are almost exactly reversed. In the case of adhesives, this is not 
unexpected, since previous data had indicated that compliance in this segment had mainly involved the 
diffusion of existing products. The high share of printing ink manufacturers acquiring competencies and 
technologies poses a puzzle that cannot be elucidated with the available data. 
Table 7: Impact of compliance R&D on knowledge base – Austrian paint, coat-
ing, printing ink and adhesive manufacturers (1999) 
Knowledge/Competencies   Technologies  Compliance R&D 
helped us acquire new 
...  Many Some None  no.    Many Some None  no. 
Product group               
OEM 53.8%  7.7%  38.5%  13    46.2%  15.4%  38.5%  13 
Architectural  coatings  28.6% 28.6% 42.9% 7    28.6% 28.6% 42.9% 7 
Printing  inks  66.7%  0.0% 33.3% 3    66.7%  0.0% 33.3% 3  
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Adhesives 33.3%  0.0%  66.7% 3    33.3%  0.0% 66.7% 3 
Firm size               
Small  80.0% 20.0%  0.0% 5    60.0% 20.0% 20.0% 5 
Medium 36.4%  9.1%  54.5%  11    36.4%  18.2%  45.5%  11 
Large  40.0% 10.0% 50.0%  10    40.0% 10.0% 50.0%  10 
All  firms  46.2% 11.5% 42.3%  26    42.3% 15.4% 42.3%  26 
Note: OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacture, which are industrial coatings.  n=26 
In contrast to Table 6, there are sizeable differences between small and larger firms in terms of the share 
of firms reporting the acquisition of some or even many new competencies or technologies. While the 
large majority of small firms responds in the affirmative, the respective share of medium-sized and large 
firms is at most 50 per cent. The most plausible explanation for these differences is once more techno-
logical backwardness, as compliance may have forced technologically backward firms to adopt cutting-
edge technology that could later be leveraged in other areas. 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to present some micro-evidence on the techno-economic conse-
quences of Austrian VOC emission standards on Austrian paint, coating, printing ink and adhesive manu-
facturers that is relevant to the discussion on the 'Porter Hypothesis'. An analysis of the evolution of Aus-
tria's revealed comparative advantage in the respective product groups shows that the strictest standards 
of their kind had no clear, that is neither unequivocally negative nor positive, impact on the competitive-
ness of manufacturers of regulated products. A similar result also emerges from a survey of Austrian 
manufacturers of paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesives in which the overwhelming majority of 
firms declares that its competitiveness has not been affected by the standards. However, firm size seems 
to matter, as the share of firms stating to have suffered declines with firm size, while the opposite is true 
of firms who were able to benefit. 
There is tentative evidence that the standards have had a dampening effect on import competition, which 
rose in the aftermath of Austria's accession to the EU in 1995. This implies that competition from abroad 
would have been considerably stronger in the absence of the environmental regulations. Accordingly, it 
may not be in the best interest of the Austrian paints, coatings, printing inks and adhesive industry to 
relax the stricter Austrian rules to the less restrictive limits mandated at the EU level. Rather than level-
ling the playing field for Austrian firms abroad, as claimed by industry representatives, it might actually 
further increase import competition in Austria. 
Besides reduced import competition, the absence of a negative impact on the competitiveness of regulated 
firms may also be due to 'innovation offsets' as predicted by the 'Porter Hypothesis'. Survey evidence 
indeed reveals considerable changes in firms' product range, which also caused the technological envi-
ronment in the industry to become more dynamic after the implementation of the standards. In other 
words, the Austrian VOC emission standards appear to have accelerated the rate of product innovation in 
a formerly rather tranquil industry, a result that has also emerged from comparable industry studies (see 
Ashford 1993).  
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R&D spending to develop compliant products is found to be very unevenly distributed. While some firms 
spent virtually nothing, other firms devoted almost their entire R&D budget to developing compliant 
products. Differences are mainly due to differences in firms' technological specialisation and to a lesser 
extent to organisational factors. There is evidence that compliance efforts displaced or postponed existing 
R&D projects, again with substantial variations by technology. 
However, survey evidence also shows that compliance efforts yielded new ideas and allowed some firms 
to acquire new competencies and technologies which they would not have acquired in the absence of the 
regulation. Yet rather than indicating the presence of clear benefits of compliance, the latter finding is 
more likely a result of technologically backward (small) firms catching up. 
These results hold a number of lessons for future work. First, environmental regulations may affect both 
exports and imports of regulated goods, a point that should be taken into account when using some meas-
ure of net-exports as indicator of competitiveness. Second, technological specialisation may have a tre-
mendous influence on the actual impact of environmental regulation. As the survey has shown, even at 
fairly low levels of aggregation (i.e. SITC or NACE 4-digit and below), firms may be active in entirely 
different markets. Third, even within a fairly homogeneous industry, size effects and organisational fac-
tors may be a source of considerable heterogeneity. 
Regarding future research, two points emerging from this paper merit further attention. First, the analysis 
points to a systematic difference between smaller and larger firms in their ability to respond to and take 
advantage of an external shock caused by an environmental regulation. Is this a general result or merely 
due to case-specific factors? Second, in the present case, compliance efforts appear to have redirected 
firms' search efforts for new technology, which appears to have yielded unexpected new ideas, knowledge 
and competencies. Future work should examine this process more systematically, especially with a view 
to clarifying whether these unexpected insights yield knowledge that helps firms to become more com-
petitive or whether it is merely the result of technologically backward firms approaching the current tech-
nological possibility frontier. 
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